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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In late October 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon won a significant 
victory with the 67 to 45 Knesset vote endorsing his unilateral Disengagement Plan from 
Gaza and parts of the West Bank.  It was a monumental step forward in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. For the first time since Israel captured the West Bank and 
Gaza in the 1967 war, the Knesset approved a plan to evacuate and destroy Jewish 
settlements in these territories.1 However, the issue simultaneously reaped serious havoc 
in Israeli society and politics. One political science professor at Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem described the event as “the most dramatic, head-on confrontation in years 
between ideology and reality, between the messianic ideology of the Israeli right and the 
pragmatic considerations of the state of Israel in its relations with the Palestinians.”2  As a 
result Sharon is now in a fight for his very political survival and the threat of civil war 
looms over Israel.   
Before the vote, Sharon told the Knesset “of the security dangers facing Israel, 
and of the demographic threat that ruling over millions of Palestinians ‘who double their 
numbers every generation’ is posing to Israeli democracy.”3  While he spoke those 
words, around 17,000 demonstrators, mostly settlers, protested outside the Knesset--
many labeling Sharon a traitor. Furthermore, Ultra-Orthodox rabbis have urged soldiers 
to disobey orders to evacuate settlements, leading to potential complications in civil-
military relations. 4  Meanwhile, polls show two-thirds of the Israeli public support the 
disengagement plan. 
The vote divided the ruling Likud party, with 23 members voting for the 
disengagement plan and 17 against it.5  Most of Sharon’s traditional allies in 
ultranationalist and religious parties deserted him and all four Arab Knesset Members 
                                                 
1 “Sharon Scores a Victory But Risks a Mutiny,” The Economist, (October 27, 2004). 
http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=3326785, October 2004 
2 John Ward Anderson, “Sharon Wins Vote for Gaza Pullout,” Washingtonpost.com, (October 27, 2004) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64391-2004Oct26?language=printer, October 2004 
3 “Sharon Scores a Victory But Risks a Mutiny”  
4 John Ward Anderson, “Sharon Wins Vote for Gaza Pullout”  
5 “Sharon Scores a Victory But Risks a Mutiny” 
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abstained.6  Immediately following the vote four key Likud ministers issued Sharon an 
ultimatum, lead by his rival Binyamin Netanyahu, to hold a national referendum on the 
pull-out within two weeks.  The right-wing National Religious Party is also demanding 
the referendum or they will bolt from the coalition, leaving Sharon with an unstable 
minority.  Sharon told the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, “I am opposed (to the referendum) 
because it will lead to terrible tensions and a rupture in the public.”  Most Likud factions 
are also against holding a national referendum, as are Labor and Shinui, the second and 
third largest parties in the Knesset respectively. 7  
The premier’s challenge is to find a political formula that allows him to stay in 
power--and implement his plan.  With crucial votes and deadlines hanging in the balance 
on both Gaza and the national budget, Sharon must choose between three unappealing 
options. First, he can concede to the pressure and hold a referendum.  The concern is that 
not only would a referendum delay the pull-out, but he may find he is unhappy with the 
result. Second, he could call for early elections, but that could lead to his demise.  
Netanyahu has been maneuvering to oust Sharon and could pull it off.  Plus, Likud 
members already voted against Sharon’s plan earlier this year, likely decreasing his 
constituency base.  The last option is to invite the Labor party into the coalition.  Still, it 
is unlikely Likud will approve such a move, and even if it did, it would stir up trouble 
given Labor criticisms of economic policy.8 
  This thesis will show that the weight of domestic factors is overwhelmingly 
important in the case of Israel’s foreign policy regarding the Palestinians. For the purpose 
of this thesis, Palestinian policy is meant to include: peace negotiations, Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, military occupation of the territories, and 
establishment of a Palestinian state.  It does not refer to issues such as: the security fence, 
assassination of terrorist leadership, status of Jerusalem, or right of return.  In a 
democracy such as Israel, domestic influence on policy is monumental--as the above 
scene setter of current Israeli affairs illustrates. This thesis will identify and assess the 
magnitude of domestic access points to foreign policymaking in Israel.  
                                                 
6 John Ward Anderson, “Sharon Wins Vote for Gaza Pullout”  
7 “Likud Referendum Panel to Submit Recommendations Within 14 Days,” Ha’aretz,  (October 27, 2004) 
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hansen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=493903, October 2004 
8 “Sharon Scores a Victory But Risks a Mutiny” 
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Since the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993, international dynamics have 
changed impacting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and U.S. goals in the Middle 
East.9  The primary American interest in the region shifted after the end of the Cold War 
from Soviet containment to promoting stability and checking rogue states.  The ongoing 
violence between Israel and the Palestinians is a destabilizing force in the Middle East.  
Peace between these two parties therefore is of great relevance and interest to the United 
States. After the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil the Bush 
Administration also revived its focus on the peace process to gain support for the global 
war on terror in the Arab world. 
Given peace treaties with neighboring Egypt and Jordan and the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein, the post-Oslo era comes with a new Israeli threat assessment.  A 
monolithic wall of Arab military powers no longer threatens Israel.  Consequently there is 
a lack of consensus in opinion on foreign policy, therein domestic inputs have become 
more important in the decisionmaking process. The only real and current threat to Israel 
is the Palestinians. Current Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, 
described the situation this way: “the conflict with the Palestinians constitutes an 
‘existential’ and ‘cancerous’ threat to Israel, a threat more serious than anything Israel 
has faced since the 1948 war of independence.”10 
This thesis is significant because it is insufficient to only be aware of Israel’s 
security needs, what the political leadership wants, and the government’s ideology.  
There is more; domestic components of foreign policy formation fill out the picture. 
Without examining these domestic influences one cannot grasp the politics of the 
possible.  
 Israel is a small, yet intensely populated political space where subcultures link 
into interest groups, which link into political parties, which involve retired military 
                                                 
9 The Oslo Accords refer to letters between Chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin, as well as the signing of the Declaration of Principles between the Israeli government and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993.  They resulted from a series of negotiations laying out a path 
to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  This was the first time the PLO and Israel recognized each 
other.  Issues handled were Palestinian self-rule, security arrangements, Palestinian elections, and an 
interim period before a permanent status settlement.  However the continuing tit-for-tat attacks between the 
Palestinians and Israelis have left the Oslo Accords ineffective at establishing a peace. 
10 Clive Jones, “One Size Fits All: Israel, Intelligence, and the al-Aqsa Intifada,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 26:273-288 (2003): 277. http://polisci.taylorandfrancis.com/pdfs/ter/julyaug03_jones.pdf 
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members, and so on.  A great deal of overlapping between elements exists within Israel 
that makes it difficult to separate them out in analysis, however this thesis will discuss 
these various aspects in as organized a manner as possible.   
There is no contemporary comprehensive assessment of domestic influences on 
Israel’s Palestinian policy.  Therefore, through the following methodology, this thesis 
will do just that.  Each chapter will focus on one of the three main areas of domestic 
influence in Israel: the political system, civil-military relations, and society.  
 Chapter II will analyze the elements that define the Israeli political arena.  Unlike 
the United States, Israel has a plethora of political parties.  Likud and Labor are the 
largest vote winners yet have never gained enough electoral support to rule the 
government independently.  Small parties, usually religious, have an enormous amount of 
political power due to the coalition structure in Israeli government.  The prime minister is 
the executive and has a prominent role in decision-making as the figurehead directing the 
political agenda.  However, even the premier’s policies are subject to Knesset approval.  
Electoral reform in the 1990s had a considerable effect on Israeli politics and trends will 
be examined in light of their impact on foreign policy today. All these aspects will be 
discussed in terms of direct access points to Israel’s foreign policy formation.   
 The third chapter focuses on the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and civil-military 
relations.  A look at the defense establishment and foreign ministry will show that 
national security dominates Israel’s behavior and therein is the top priority in determining 
foreign policy.  Militarism and military service in Israel illustrate how the military 
permeates Israeli collectiveness and therefore the IDF is a domestic constituency every 
Israeli leader must take into account.  Palestinian policy preferences within the defense 
establishment as well as the role of religion in military service give bearing on 
applicability to foreign policy inputs.  Retired senior officers carry a great deal of 
influence in government as many pursue political careers after they hang up their 
uniform.  Civil-military relations in Israel are closely knit while the military has 
increasingly enlarged its profile in the partnership.  Evidence of possible instances where 
the IDF has taken Palestinian policy in their own hands will be explored. More recently 
Israeli civil-military relations have indicated conflict over foreign policy, which directly 
impacts Palestinian related issues.  
 5
 Chapter IV delves into the various entities that make up Israeli society.  Israel is 
by no stretch a homogenous society. There is an internal debate in Israel over national 
identity with diverse groups trying to make their definition the rule. Different communal 
or ethnic groups make up the societal landscape. Multiple subcultures, often 
differentiated by religious preferences, also represent factions with potential access to the 
government’s decisionmaking process.  Interest groups advocating opposing positions in 
foreign affairs are highly active in lobbying the government. Each of these groups has 
diverse views on how the State should approach the peace process with the Palestinians.  
Every elected leader at some point will be held accountable to public opinion.  Studies on 
Israeli opinion show the majority favor peace with the Palestinians over continued 
conflict.  Additionally the media plays an interesting role in foreign policy by forming 
how issues are relayed to society and therefore can have a positive or negative impact on 
the support for certain policies.  
All the aspects discussed in the previous chapters play part to some extent in 
determining Israel’s Palestinian policy.  The conclusion chapter will compare these topics 
and rank them in order of importance.  Given the evaluation, recommendations will be 
made for what--if anything--the U.S. can do in its relationship with Israel to further the 
peace process with the Palestinians.  
Ultimately, more important than simply applying international relations theories 
of Realism or the Two-Level game, is to grasp domestic aspects in Israel.11  Other 
theories such as constructivism and bureaucratic politics account for domestic factors that 
drive government actions, but similarly, by themselves do not provide a complete  
                                                 
11 Realism is a paradigm based on some of the following assumptions: the international arena is anarchic 
and consists of independent political states; states are the primary actors and wield some offensive military 
capability or power; the primary motive driving states is survival or maximization of power; and states are 
interest seeking rational actors. See Hans Morgenthau, “Politics Among Nations; The Struggle for Power 
and Peace,” (Random House, 1972). Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Game theory asserts that negotiations are 
complex and most states must pursue two levels of bargaining simultaneously: international bargaining 
between states, and between the state’s negotiators and its various domestic constituencies. See Robert D. 
Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 2-Level Games." International Organization 
42:3 (Summer 1988): 427-469. 
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explanation of Israeli foreign policy.12 This thesis will show how formation of Israel’s 
policy regarding the Palestinians results largely from certain domestic pressures.  Key 
points of influence that one must recognize because of their prominence in this respect 
are: the prime minister, smaller political parties, coalition politics, the role of the IDF as a 
constituency as well as advisor to and implementer of foreign policy, the balance in civil-
military relations, certain societal subcultures, and interest groups. 
 
                                                 
12 The main theoretical principle of Constructivism is that a state’s behavior is shaped by elite beliefs, 
collective norms, and social identities.  Constructivists are interested in current and predominant public 
discourse because it shapes those beliefs, norms, and identities. See Stephen M. Walt, "International 
Relations: One World, Many Theories" (Foreign Policy, Spring 1998). Bureaucratic politics theory 
espouses that government policy is not made by a single decisionmaker, but a combination of junior and 
senior players who often disagree about what the government should due in a particular policy area and 
compete to influence government policy.  Senior players are major political actors, the military, and in 
some cases the body controlling government purse strings.  Junior players consist of the media, interest 
groups, other members of parliament, and the public. These junior players form concentric circles around 
the senior players, which define the boundaries in which the government operates.  Democratic government 
systems are subject to the approval of--and pressure from--the wider circles of individuals that force senior 
players to accommodate their policy interests. See Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, 
“Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications.” World Politics, Vol. 24 (Spring, 1972), 
40-79. 
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II.  POLITICS 
In 1995, the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a right-wing 
extremist was followed by an outpouring of sympathy in Israeli society for his efforts 
towards peace with the Palestinians and a desire to continue in his foreign policy quest.  
Rabin’s successor, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, was then attacked by a political rival as 
being too soft on security (coming from a non-military background) and even being pro-
Arab.13  To defend his image and bolster his political standing, Peres implemented a very 
aggressive and militant policy towards the Palestinians.  Still, by 1996 more Israelis had 
been killed in the previous three years at the hands of Palestinians than in 15 years 
combined before Oslo was signed.14  The theme in domestic Israeli politics shifted to 
maintaining national security, bringing about the election of a hard-line government 
which rejected Oslo’s legitimacy and premise, while also signaling it would not honor 
informal commitments on the Israeli-Syrian peace track.  All these examples have one 
theme in common: domestic political battles or political perception strongly influenced 
foreign policy outcomes.  
This chapter will dissect the specifics of the Israeli government structure to show 
the access points for domestic influence on foreign policymaking, specifically in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The electorate, political parties, the prime minister, Knesset, 
and coalitions, are all actors--some more prominent than others--on the Israeli political 
scene.  Voters determine the clout of political parties, composition of the Knesset, and 
selection of the prime minister – who then forms a coalition based upon a policy strategy 
or need to accommodate coalition members.  Electoral reform in the 1990s produced 
trends that became an important issue in domestic politics by affecting these different 




                                                 
13 Joel Peters, “Under Netanyahu: The Current Situation in Israeli Politics,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1997): 2. 
14 Clive Jones and Emma C. Murphy, Israel: Challenges to Identity, Democracy, and the State, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 112. 
 8
A. VOTING PARTICIPATION AND ISSUE VOTING 
As a democracy, the public is crucial to the Israeli system of government.  Israeli 
voters embody one very valuable resource -- numbers.15  Voting participation in Israel is 
among the highest in the world, close to 80% of the eligible voters voluntarily go to the 
ballot box on election day.  Since the 1980s, data attests issue voting has grown 
significantly more important.  Specifically, the issue of the future of the territories has 
become exceedingly influential.  In 1996, 71% of Israeli respondents said that the issue of 
the territories would greatly influence their vote, an increase of 20% since 1992.16  And 
in 1999, one’s vote for prime minister rested largely on their attitude towards negotiations 
with the Palestinians.17  
B. POLITICAL PARTIES 
Political parties in Israel are dependent on electoral outcomes.  Each party’s 
number of seats in the Knesset is directly proportional to the number of votes they win.  
In Israel’s government system, political parties play a crucial part in policy formation if 
included in the government.  The leanings of political parties define how Israeli national 
identity is expressed by the government and in turn how that identity relates to policy 
regarding the Palestinians.  There are a few clear instances to illustrate the influence 
political parties have on the policymaking process. One was in May of 2004 when Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan was defeated in a vote by his own 
party, Likud.  This resulted in a halt of all policy as Sharon had to scramble to try and 
rally enough support to move forward with his plan, even a watered-down version. This 
then leads to the second example, when Sharon contemplated bringing Labor into the 
coalition to garner enough votes to push the policy of disengagement through.   However, 
again, his own political party voted in August 2004, against allowing the centrist Labor 
into the government.  To add insult to injury, Likud additionally denied Sharon’s request 
                                                 
15 Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel, (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), 
74. 
16 Ibid., 222. 
17 Barry Rubin, ed., “Special Report: Analysis of the Israeli Elections,” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs Issue 7 (June 1999). http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/research-g/israeli-elections.html 
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to pursue coalition negotiations “with any Zionist party” in his efforts to regain his lost 
majority in the Knesset.18 
 The two major parties in Israel, Labor and Likud, can be compared on particular 
aspects of foreign policy. Depending which is the main party in power (and which party 
the prime minister hails from), certain government behavior can be anticipated. In regards 
to land claims based on religion verses security, Labor does not utilize reference to 
religious rights of the West Bank or Gaza and prefers to justify settlements in terms of 
national security.  Whereas, with Likud security is certainly important, however 
legitimacy for the settlements is based on Jews’ historic and religious rights to the land.19  
The approach to policy regarding the territories is therefore a distinguishing feature 
between Labor and Likud recognized by Israelis. Labor articulates the position that Israel 
can be sustained without the territories and is more willing to use them as a bargaining 
chip for progress towards coexistence.  Likud mainly however, stakes their position of 
the territories on the idea of redemption, survival through continued Jewish military 
superiority, and a duty to settle the whole land of Israel -- territories included.   
C. THE PRIME MINISTER 
If one person were to be considered the most influential in Israel’s policymaking, 
it is the prime minister.  Each prime minister since Oslo has had to contend with the 
substantial domestic challenges confronting Israel.  The Zionist ethos that was so strong 
in the early life of Israel has lost much of its appeal among wider society today.  There is 
also a declining willingness to serve in the military, once unthinkable.  Furthermore the 
divide between secular and religious Jews has been widening.  These three factors have 
heightened tensions in Israel.  Therefore, premiers have had to navigate all these issues 
when forming foreign policy with the Palestinians.   
The prime minister is head of the executive branch, the cabinet, their party, and 
the ruling coalition.20 “While they may share power with party allies and coalition 
                                                 
18 Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, “Sharon, Arafat Face Challenges in Ranks.” 
Washingtonpost.com August 19, 2004. 
19 Fred Gottheil, “Demographic and Economic Forces Underlining Likud's Perspective of the West Bank,” 
in Bernard Reich and Kieval R. Gershon, eds. Israeli Politics in the 1990s: Key Domestic and Foreign 
Policy Factors, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.), 134-5. 
20 Asher Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 35. 
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partners, the agenda is there to be set by prime ministers.”21  As an elected official, the 
prime minister is driven by three main concerns: political, public, and those involving 
legitimacy. 
 The main political consideration of a prime minister is that they “are only as 
strong as they can force their colleagues to let them be.”22  Therefore, bureaucratic 
politics is likely to be a sizeable investment of the prime minister.  He is conscious to 
keep, and if possible, enhance his political clout.23  He is also aware that others, both 
within and outside his party, covet his position and will jockey to steal it. Often, these 
domestic players interfere in foreign policymaking at crucial junctures. There are several 
illustrations where former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also of Likud, was a 
thorn in the side of Sharon during his efforts to move forward in the peace process.  In 
May 2002, Netanyahu convinced the Likud Central Committee to vote against the 
possibility of the formation of a Palestinian state in negotiations.  This was however, over 
Sharon’s strong objection, which was ready to make the costly concession as part of 
negotiations.24  Then, leading up to the Likud vote on Sharon’s Disengagement Plan in 
May of 2004, Netanyahu spoke out strongly against Sharon’s policy plan to try and 
bolster support for his own political aspirations. Although Netanyahu finally supported 
the plan at the last minute, his earlier arguments may have had lingering effects as the 
plan was still rejected by Sharon’s party.   
Then later, as Sharon attempted to bring a scaled back version of his Gaza 
disengagement plan to the cabinet for a vote, Netanyahu declared he would strongly 
object any proposal by the prime minister unless is mirrored his own vision for 
evacuation of the settlements.  Many involved in Israeli politics saw this purely as a 
political ploy by Netanyahu to make matters more difficult for Sharon and undermine his 
political authority. In other words, wrangling for power within the domestic political 
arena often drives foreign policy actions.  Therefore, the prime minister must keep these 
behind-the-scenes political considerations in mind as he orchestrates political maneuvers.  
                                                 
21 Ibid., 35. 
22 Ibid., 59. 
23 Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel, 16. 
24 Cameron S. Brown, “Israel’s 2003 Elections: A Victory for the Moderate Right and Secular Center,” 
Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 7, No. 1 (March 2003). 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a7.html 
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Prime Minister Ehud Barak did so in 1999 when he formed his government—and foreign 
policy approaches.  He was careful to place potential rivals like Shimon Peres, and Yossi 
Beilin, in posts where they would not have too much influence on policy regarding the 
peace process.25 
 Since the people elect the prime minister, his second major consideration is the 
public.  More recently in Israel, this has called for the prime minister giving the 
perception the peace process is healthy.  If voters decide the prime minister is not 
bringing the best results possible, they relieve him. This is what happened when voters 
decided that Peres was too weak on security issues and Netanyahu was not trying enough 
to move forward in the peace process.26 Barak was so concerned the Israeli public would 
think he went too far in offering concessions to the Palestinians at Camp David II, that he 
“asked if President Clinton could say something that might help him back home.”27 
Therefore, miscalculation of public opinion, inadequate attention given to the 
demands of major groups, or those concerning marginal groups can all be politically 
dangerous.28  Peres found out just how crucial popular support is to the prime minister in 
the 1996 election and serves as an ideal example of how domestic factors indeed 
influence the government.  At the time, the immigrants from the former Soviet Union 
comprised 13% of the Israeli electorate.  In 1996 they embodied an extreme feeling of 
dissatisfaction that the state had not done enough to improve their situation.  Therefore 
the Russian immigrants, driven by discontent, reacted with a voter backlash against the 
incumbent.  The opponent, Netanyahu, won the election by such a narrow margin it 
proved the communal vote to be decisive.29  To reiterate, domestic needs drive foreign 
policy.  
 The third consideration requiring energy of the prime minister in regards to 
policymaking is gaining legitimacy.  Since the benefits of peace could come at the cost of 
territory, security, settlements, and ideology, the prime minister must obtain ample 
                                                 
25 Myron J. Aronoff, “The Americanization of Israeli Politics and Realignment of the Party System,” Israel 
Studies 5:1 (2000), 106. 
26 Cameron S. Brown, “Israel’s 2003 Elections: A Victory for the Moderate Right and Secular Center.” 
27 William B Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israel Conflict Since 1967, 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 367. 
28 Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel, 143. 
29 Zvi Gitelman and Ken Goldstein, “The ‘Russian’ Revolution in Israeli Politics,” in Asher Arian and 
Michal Shamir, eds., The Elections in Israel 1999 (SUNY, 2002), 143. 
 12
legitimacy for peace policy initiatives.30  Given the lack of consensus in Israel over the 
value and means of achieving peace, building legitimacy for policy is necessary for 
effective formulation and implementation of policy regarding the Palestinians.  This in 
turn should encourage the prime minister’s confidence in pursuing such a policy and 
enhancing their track record on the peace process.31  
 However, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres 
did not heed this lesson. They failed to recognize the magnitude of the resistance towards 
the Oslo negotiations with the Palestinians. Hence, they fell short in conveying to 
opposition parties, right-wing interest groups--including all the settlers, and the majority 
of the public, the benefits, necessity, timeliness, and value of their peace plan. At the 
same time, they dropped the ball when it came to showing that a sincere peace was 
developing, clarifying the final objectives of the peace policy, and how it would be 
implemented.  A more successful policy implementation might have established broader 
legitimacy for the Oslo accords with better management of the opposition.32 Recent 
Israeli political history suggests that prime ministers cannot balance foreign 
policymaking and execution with domestic survival needs.  
D. THE KNESSET 
Another player on the Israeli political stage is the Knesset.  The Knesset is a 
single chamber legislature of 120 members, the composition of which is determined by 
elections.  The Knesset provides two access points in the policymaking process.  The 
first, are the debates held in the Knesset over defense and settlement policy.  In this 
environment Knesset members have the potential to directly influence decisionmakers.  
However, in actuality, this access is often limited since government members’ attendance 
is irregular.  Since the senior key players in government decisionmaking choose not to sit 
in on most Knesset debates, it is not a strong access point to Israel’s foreign behavior.  
Hence, influence on policy is more limited to those Knesset members included in the 
ruling coalition and their Cabinet representatives, rather than in Knesset debates.  What 
real influence the Knesset has is perhaps indirect.  Debates on foreign policy are 
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frequently televised and have the ability to shape public opinion, and thus impact policy 
resulting from discussion generated on defense, security, and settlement issues.33  
 The relationship between the legislative body and chief executive in Israel has 
been described as a ‘balance of terror.’  Each have the authority under direct election 
rules to dismiss each other over a policy face-off.  The prime minister can dissolve the 
Knesset with agreement from the president.  Or, the Knesset can dismiss the prime 
minister through a no-confidence vote by 61 seats in the Knesset, or by failing to approve 
the budget within three months after its submission.34  Prime ministers in Israel are 
keenly aware of this threat.  Domestic political survival more heavily tempers foreign 
policy moves when: the budget approval is near, if ousting of the prime minister is a 
possibility through a no-confidence vote, or the Knesset fears the premier might try to 
dissolve it in hopes of gaining a more agreeable legislative branch after new elections. 
After Sharon continued to bring his Gaza disengagement plan to a vote in the cabinet, 
many members in the Likud felt betrayed by their party leader.  Yifrah Shalom, chairman 
of Likud’s representation in the Gaza Coast Regional Council warned of the political 
repercussions, “If Sharon insists, we will either go to the polls or have to replace the 
chairman.”35 A new norm appears to have been set in the relationship between the 
legislative and the executive as well.  While it is not written into Israel’s basic laws for 
the government to submit peace policies to the Knesset, a precedent has emerged.  Since 
Olso, the government is expected to bring peace agreements before the Knesset for 
approval as a result of the precedent set from Camp David, 1979-1981.36   
E. COALITIONS 
 A vital participant in the Israeli government system is the coalition, and its 
composition determines peace process potential.  Shortly after they are elected, prime 
ministers set to work on designing their government.  In Israel this means fashioning a 
coalition since there has never been a sole party that has won enough Knesset seats for a 
61 member majority.  Payoffs in coalition politics are substantial and therefore coalition 
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negotiations are quite competitive.  Many matters are bargained over during the coalition 
formation process, policy being a prominent one.  Each prime minister has a vision for 
the kind of policy he wishes to pursue regarding the Palestinians, and is aware he must 
choose coalition partners that will allow him to pursue those objectives.  Or his coalition 
choices and desire to stay in power constrain the range of objectives the premier can 
pursue.  
This was demonstrated when Rabin, leader of the Labor alignment, won the 1992 
election in a strong enough position to create a center-left coalition without including any 
right-wing or religious parties.  Rabin’s vision for Israel was tied to moving forward in 
the peace process.  Rabin appealed to domestic concerns to amplify support for his 
foreign policy goals.  He saw withdrawal from the territories, not only as enhancing 
Israel’s long-term security, but beneficial for the economy and society as a whole.  The 
coalition Rabin selected agreed withdrawal would allow for reallocation of financial 
recourses to social welfare, develop an environment friendly to foreign investment, and 
integration of Israel into the global economy.37  As a result, it was this government that 
signed the Oslo accords in 1993, marking one of the most significant milestones to date 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
Prime Minister Barak also drove coalition formation by his quest of achieving a 
certain foreign policy.  Barak wanted a broad coalition that would provide a strong 
foundation for a peace agreement with the Palestinians. Given the strength and position 
of his own Labor party, Barak had to decide between inviting Shas or Likud into his 
coalition after his victory in the 1999 election.  Shas would most likely follow the prime 
minister’s lead on foreign policy initiatives, though could possibly cause domestic social 
and political strife. Yet, Likud would pose fewer obstacles in social, economic, or 
religious issues, but would certainly try to thwart the premier in Palestinian policy.  
Ultimately, Barak weighed what was most important to him and chose Shas for their 
influence and support on the peace process.38 In other words, foreign policy trumped the 
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domestic agenda. Yet, this also suggests a two-way street: that foreign politics can 
likewise drive domestic politics.   
Even after the coalition is formed, often complications arise in policy 
implementation.  A government system based on complex coalition politics has found 
many of Israel’s policymakers in uncomfortable positions.  Coalition members do not 
always behave as the prime minister would expect, or desire.  Coalitions can block 
foreign policy initiatives making progress in the peace process impossible.  The inherent 
warning in a coalition system is that the prime minister must pay attention to the demands 
of partners when developing a foreign policy plan.  For one or more parties could 
withdraw from the coalition over friction on a particular policy, pulling the proverbial 
“carpet of the majority” out from under the prime minister.  Prime Minister Netanyahu 
witnessed the crumbling of his coalition over a foreign policy dispute, and Sharon is in a 
similar position.  Before the cabinet vote, he was forced to fire two ministers from the 
ultranationalist National Union Party who opposed the passing of his disengagement 
plan.  Two more ministers from the far-right National Religious Party also quit, leaving 
Sharon’s coalition with only 59 votes in the Knesset.39 This is an example of how 
domestic political structures sometimes hamper foreign policy.  
  The possibilities for progress in the peace process can be ascertained by coalition 
make-up. A prime minister’s willingness and ability to move forward with foreign policy 
regarding the Palestinians is impacted by the reliance on smaller parties to maintain 
coalition cohesion.  Smaller parties are able to bully bigger ones on policy measures for 
both know small party support is critical for the ruling coalition’s ability to function.  
Where a coalition measures on the political scale depends on the ideology of these 
smaller parties and the policy orientation of the group to which they belong.  The bloc of 
parties on the Right emphasizes the inclination of the Palestinians towards never-ending 
violence and denial of Israel’s right to exist. Therefore, parties oriented on the Right 
advocate more militant policies and are generally in line with demands of the religious 
parties.40 Hence, a right-of-center coalition is more inclined towards a national identity 
that necessitates a policy for retaining the territories.   
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Parties oriented to the Left appeal to the original Zionist vision of a homogeneous 
Jewish state and argue prolonged control over a non-Jewish population is neither just nor 
feasible.  Therein, the Left tends to be more conciliatory in reference to the future of the 
territories as well as the Palestinians and is mostly supported by secular Jews.41  As a 
result, a left-of-center coalition is likely to advocate a policy of withdrawal from the 
territories rather than continued occupation.42  Analyzing the ideological leanings of the 
parties in a ruling coalition can lead one to identify the conditions under which a foreign 
policy will be defined and the extent to which a probable environment exists for progress 
in the peace process with the Palestinians.43  The implication is that Israeli foreign policy 
is not “Realist” in an international relations sense, but ideological. 
F. ELECTORAL REFORM 
 A new electoral law was passed through the Knesset in 1992, known as The Basic 
Law: The Government.  The reform was two-fold: 1) the threshold for obtaining a 
Knesset seat was raised from 1 to 1.5%, and 2) it allowed for the direct election of a 
prime minister.  The reform resulted in a dramatic drop in the parliamentary 
representation of Labor and Likud, an increase in the representation of smaller parties 
based on group identities and religion, and growing tensions between the executive and 
legislature. 
 The new electoral system enabled the voter to split the ticket between the premier 
and the parliament. National interest, often in terms of peace policy, became the deciding 
factor for the prime minister, where many voters cast ballots based on individual interests 
such as ethnic or religious identities for the Knesset.  The two big parties were weakened 
in the aftermath, with their electoral strength injured.  Evidence of the declining trend of 
the two major parties was seen in the 1999 election where Likud lost 13 seats, and the 
Labor eight more since 1996.  The outcome was the lowest parliamentary representation 
in over 40 years, 45 Knesset seats for both parties.44   
An integral cause of the lessening dominance of the two major parties was the 
proliferation of smaller ones.  This trend of increasing fragmentation of the party system 
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occurred despite raising the threshold to 1.5%.  For example, compared to 10 parties in 
1992 and 13 in 1996, the Knesset in 1999 was composed of 19 parties -- some with only 
a handful of seats.45  Therefore, smaller parties had a disproportionate amount of political 
clout as they made the difference between the government having a majority or falling 
out of power.46  Additionally, the more parties included in a coalition, the more diversity 
of identities and points of view vying for the pursuit of their interests, making it more 
difficult to come to a consensus. 
The real victors of this split-ticket system, as the experiences of 1996 and 1999 
testify, were the religious parties. Religious parties won 20% of the vote in 1996 resulting 
in three lists gaining parliamentary representation, and a record high of 23 Knesset 
seats.47 The expansion continued in 1999 as the number of seats gained by religious 
parties, including the Ashkenazic ultra-Orthodox party, United Torah Judaism and the 
National Religious Party, rose to 28 -- another all time high.48 Additionally, Shas, the 
ultra-Orthodox Sephardic party, won 17 seats in 1999, almost triple their representation 
in 1992.  This catapulted them to the third largest party in Israeli politics and endowed 
Shas with invaluable leverage in determining the stability of the government.49  All these 
factors gave religious parties political leverage often inconsistent with the actual size of 
their support base when it came to matters of policy.   
 Additionally, the Knesset became much weaker after the reform mainly due to 
political parties abandoning their cohesiveness and concentration for competing spots in 
the prime minister’s coalition. At the same time, the reform granted the prime minister 
greater legitimacy since he was directly chosen by the people.  Although the electoral law 
allowed for greater autonomy of the prime minister, his freedom to maneuver was still 
limited.  Netanyahu experienced this as he was still dependent on backing from his own 
party as well as the will of smaller parties in his government with their competing 
agendas.  The prime minister was often pulled back and forth by these various 
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constituencies as they fought over political spoils, making him ineffective.50  The Wye 
Accords illustrate how Netanyahu tried to please everyone, but ended up alienating both 
his right and moderate allies.  Moderates like Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai 
became so outraged over Netanyahu’s timid approach to Oslo that he defected and 
actually ran against the prime minister in 1999.  On the other side, Netanyahu’s 
conservative partners, such as Benny Begin, were so upset over Netanyahu’s acceptance 
of territorial withdrawal they withdrew from the coalition.51  This left Netanyahu no 
choice but to call for early elections rather than run the risk of a no-confidence vote in the 
Knesset.   
Regardless of the actual composition of the parliament, the directly elected prime 
minister had the task of establishing a coalition with a majority.  Each political party 
courting the prime minister for a coveted position in the ruling coalition presented its 
policy demands and portfolio preferences.  Since a government can only pursue a single 
policy posture on a given issue it must secure enough internal political support to do so. 
In order to entice parties to concede their foreign policy preferences, the prime minister’s 
party must compensate partners with control over important government ministries and 
Knesset committees.52  This facet of governance ensnared Prime Minister Netanyahu.  In 
his haste to persuade parties to join the coalition, he made too many promises regarding 
ministerial positions and left few for his own party.53  This offended many senior leaders 
in Likud who had to settle for less prominent posts, and cultivated a feeling of hostility 
towards Netanyahu’s future policies. 
Ironically, the electoral reform accomplished the opposite of that for which it was 
intended.  It was designed to improve government stability, effectiveness, and fair 
distribution of political resources by halting governmental fragmentation and limiting the 
bargaining power of small parties.  However, in practice, it only exaggerated these 
problems.  Thus public opinion waned as the new system was used bringing the repeal of 
the law in 2001, reinstating a single ballot system.54  
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1. After Reversal of the Electoral Reform 
 The 2003 elections, held after the reversal of the electoral reform, paint quite a 
different picture.  They showed the initial trends resulting from electoral reform lacked 
perseverance. There was a decrease in religious and sectarian parties and an increase in 
secular parties.  Shas, the surprising success story of the 1999 elections, lost over one-
third of its voter support, translating into a loss of six seats for a major religious party.  
Similarly, as 1999 brought the highest level of influence ever for sectarian-based parties, 
specifically Russian, they conversely received a severe blow in 2003.  None of the 
Russian parties attracted enough support to pass the 1.5% threshold, and all their 
representation in the Knesset dried up.55   
Many speculate this was due to a shift in Israeli society from a sectarian to 
security focus.  This shift resulted in a swing to the moderate right, with many Israelis 
softening their position on the Arab-Israeli conflict in aims to bolster security at home.  
There were two signals of this shift.  One being that the majority in Likud now supported 
the formation of a Palestinian state. Secondly, the majority of Israelis who were 
conventionally indifferent to the settlements now favored trading land for peace.  For 
instance, in 2003, 62% were willing to dismantle most settlements as part of a peace 
agreement, an increase from 38% the previous year.56   The aspect of domestic influence 
responsible for preventing those 62% from getting what they want is discussed in Chapter 
IV on Israeli society. 
The last significant trend begun in 2003 was the rise of the secular party, Shinui.  
Shinui jumped from 6 seats in 1999 to 15 in 2003, making it the third largest party in the 
Knesset.  The success of Shinui can be attributed to its self-portrayal as centrist on 
matters of security, an alternate to Labor who some felt had moved too far left.  Shinui’s 
triumph marked a significant accomplishment, the first government in over 25 years 
formed without any influence from ultra-Orthodox parties, and optimistic possibilities for 
foreign policy regarding Palestinian issues.57  
 
 
                                                 





Israeli foreign policy is domestically fed. Some conclusions can be drawn about 
the relative magnitude of the access certain facets of the polity have in influencing 
foreign policy.  Understanding the degree of power held by each actor enables one to 
determine the distinct places the Israeli government system can be pushed or pulled.  
Based on the discussion presented in this chapter, actors can be placed in two groups: 
major and minor players.  The minor players in the policymaking process are the Knesset 
and the temporary electoral reform. Information suggests the Knesset lacks the direct 
channel to the political elite’s decisionmaking process and therefore its influence is 
limited.  “The Knesset at most can voice an opinion through its members, but has no 
power of decision.”58 The Knesset can, however, still topple the government with a vote 
of no-confidence.  Electoral reform did facilitate some enduring effects, like the 
decreasing representation of the two largest parties in government.  However, the reform 
did not impact the prime minister’s autonomy from the political system.  He remained 
dependent on the Knesset for confidence and continued to be constrained, as proven by 
the Netanyahu example. Furthermore, electoral reform did not have a lasting impact on 
policymaking as the trends were reversed, evidenced by the 2003 election.  Another 
variable is the more recent personalization of Israeli politics, following after the 
American model.59 
The major domestic players in Palestinian policy are the electorate, political 
parties, the prime minister, and coalitions.  Voters are the least of the major players.  
They actively participate through Israel’s democratic nature in choosing the makers of 
policy, but voter’s influence after casting the ballot is nonexistent until the next election.  
Individual political parties can wield considerable weight when they wish to do so as 
illustrated by the Likud intervention against Sharon.  Most important are the small and/or 
religious parties who have power in excess of their size.  Both the two largest as well as 
small parties can block foreign policy initiatives in Israel’s system of government.  The 
heavy hitters in foreign policy are the prime minister and the ruling coalition.  Despite all 
the troubles other participants can cause, the prime minister still has substantial power in 
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the policymaking process.  He is further strengthened when backed by Israeli society—
and especially the cabinet.  The biggest of the major players is the ruling coalition, as it 
defines the size and shape of the box the prime minister has to operate within.  
Additionally, the coalition can voice inputs at various points during policy formation.  
The major domestic players in Israel’s foreign policy work together in a web of 
interaction.  The significant implication is to comprehend how, and in what 
circumstances, they operate.  Political parties can make or break a prime minister or 
coalition.  The prime minister has the ability to lead his party and drive the coalition.  
Meanwhile the coalition can come to the aid of the prime minister when his party fails 
him or break up the government in disagreement.  Ultimately, all of the actors in the 
Israeli government system work as parts of body, none able to accomplish anything 
independently. Though depending on the dynamics of the situation, some are certainly 
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III. THE IDF AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The rising threat to Israel from Palestinian acts of violence as well as other 
international terrorist groups has called into question the military’s influence on foreign 
policy.  In his 2002 article “The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy,” Yoram 
Peri, noted literature on the impact of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) on civilian 
policymaking is limited. Moreover, the military’s participation in the peace process with 
the Palestinians has not been studied.60 This chapter will address both topics.  
Understanding the balance of civil-military relations in Israel is paramount to 
determining domestic access points in Israel’s Palestinian policy.  
The IDF’s influence on policymaking will be analyzed through discussion of 
militarism and military service in Israel.  Within the IDF there exist varying views on 
Palestinian issues, and these along with religious allegiances and the abundance of retired 
officers in civilian politics all provide even further potential for input of the military into 
the civilian decisionmaking process. Since Oslo and increased Palestinian attacks on 
Israeli citizens, the military has played a stronger role in civil-military relations in regard 
to peace policy and negotiations, and has also exhibited some behavior that the IDF is 
trying to act more autonomously.  During this time period as well, there have been 
disagreements between the civilian and military branches on foreign policy involving the 
Palestinians.   
 By its nature, the IDF is a reflection of Israeli society.  Reserve service integrates 
the military into the civilian sphere and life in the military hardly varies from the pace 
and environment of civilian life.61  The boundaries between military and civil institutions 
are blurred because the IDF in many ways is the heartbeat of Israeli society.  These 
permeable boundaries were designed to facilitate civil-military relations. Even if these 
lines are sometimes unclear, a remarkable civil-military relationship exists in Israel. 
Given that Israel has been in a state of ongoing war since its independence, requiring a 
powerful military, it has not been at the expense of its democratic nature.  
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 Throughout Israel’s history, the military has remained subordinate to civilian 
control. Most other countries in the Middle East have suffered a series of military coups 
and, until recently many states in the region have been governed by men in uniform. 
Comparatively, it is quite impressive that in Israel the military has never overthrown the 
civilian authority.62 By formal stipulation the civil branch rules the civil-military 
relationship. In an informal sense, the military is not isolated in the barracks, but yields 
major influence in the political sphere and is very active in political life at its highest 
levels.63  This explains why the military has remained satisfied with the civil-military 
structure in Israel.  
 While the civilian government has practiced control over the IDF, at the same it 
must depend on the military. There is a clear example in 1996 of how dependent the 
civilian leadership had become on the expertise of the military in the peace process for 
information and intelligence assessments, political planning, and practical know-how of 
IDF commanders having served in the territories.  When Netanyahu became prime 
minister he disagreed with the previous administration’s use of senior military officers in 
political affairs and announced that peace talks would be handled solely by civilians. 
However, before long, he realized he absolutely needed the military’s knowledge to 
conduct political-security negotiations with the Palestinians, and had no choice to bring 
the military back into the fold.64  
1. Israeli Foreign Policy 
 Israel’s first prime minister--and defense minister--David Ben-Gurion, set the 
priority of national security over diplomacy in the 1950s.65 Despite changes in Israeli-
Palestinian dynamics since Oslo, the traditional position that Israel has no foreign policy, 
only a defense policy remains the prevailing lens through which Israel views its external 
landscape. Today, security is still central to the Israel’s foreign policymaking.66  
In the contest for influence within the Israeli cabinet, the foreign ministry has 
played a subordinate role to the premier and defense ministry.  For instance, Uri Savir, of 
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the Foreign Ministry, was responsible for brokering the negotiations that led to the Oslo 
accords.  However, his involvement was circumvented as leadership in the defense 
ministry and the IDF planned the implementation of the Accords once they were signed.67  
2. The Defense Ministry and Policy 
 A strong emphasis on defense has become an Israeli way of life. Defense policy 
commands the utmost attention, largest slice of the budget68 and involves years of service 
from the majority of Israeli citizens.69 Furthermore, most senior decision makers grew up 
in the IDF and were molded by the same socialization processes.70  Additionally, the 
division between policymaking and military loyalty can be foggy as prime ministers 
sometimes serve as their own defense ministers, such as Levi Eshkol, Menachem Begin, 
Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ehud Barak.71  
A. THE MILITARY 
1. Militarism 
We are a generation of settlers, yet without a helmet or a gun barrel we will 
be unable to plant a tree or build a house…The only choice we have is to be 
armed, strong and resolute or else our sword will fall from our hands and the 
thread of our lives will be severed.72 
 
Moshe Dayan, then chief of staff, spoke these words in 1956; yet they still 
encompass an important element of Israeli culture that impacts foreign policy regarding 
the Palestinians today.  This attitude has allowed Israel to become an example of a 
militaristic society.  In Israel, military considerations almost always come before 
political, economic, or even ideological concerns.73  One could argue that ideology drives 
the IDF, as strictly military evaluations would infrequently drive Israel to choose the 
actions it does.  Therefore, the peace process is also a military matter. In the IDF, national 
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security is the main focus and most believe that all other foreign policy issues, including 
the peace process, must be dealt with accordingly.  
2. Military Service 
Israel has one of the highest percentages of its citizens in the military, and is one 
of the most battle-trained forces in the world. In 2002, around 600,000 men and women 
serve in its air, ground, and naval forces—including the reserves.  Israel practices 
universal conscription for active duty, with exceptions for Arab or ultra-orthodox 
citizens.  All Israelis, regardless of gender, are eligible for a draft into the IDF when they 
turn 18.  Reservists, overwhelmingly males, make up almost 10 percent of the population.  
For these reasons, a social significance is associated with military service and is the most 
collectively shared of all national experiences.74  
3. Policy Preferences in the IDF 
Military leadership’s viewpoints on Palestinian issues have influence on 
decisionmaking and represent both sides of the debate. Since beginning negotiations with 
the Palestinians many generals tend to be more dovish in their position regarding 
territorial entrenchment and support the idea of Palestinian self-determination -- often 
more than wider Israeli society.75  The military conventionally employs pragmatic 
approaches and therefore many senior officers realize these stances could mean less 
commitment of forces in potentially lethal areas and minimize future conflicts.  This 
practice of evaluating the battlefield is what has led IDF senior commanders to support 
peace-oriented policies.76  
A look at a Syrian example shows how senior military leaders think more 
pragmatically leading them to push for peace.  The current CGS Lt. Gen Moshe Ya'alon 
recently “threw down the gauntlet to his Prime Minister.” Ya’alon is a known hard-liner, 
but has come out with more dovish statements than Sharon and Mofaz, urging to open 
peace negotiations with Syria.  It might seem out of character for the military, not the 
civilians, to be the ones encouraging the release of the Golan Heights.  Yet the CGS 
recognizes with the loss of USSR support, Syria is no match for Israel militarily.  Also, 
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IDF leadership understands that making peace with Syria will have positive ripple 
effects.  It would buy Israeli legitimacy in the Arab world and steal thunder from 
motivation for Hizbollah attacks on the IDF and Israeli citizens.77 
In light of dovish perspectives, two military subgroups warrant particular 
attention.  The first includes members of the IDF that have had close contact with the 
Palestinian population or leadership.  After such experiences these officers became more 
sensitive to Palestinian needs as well as the logic behind their reasoning, and as a result 
they were more agreeable to cooperating with their requests. This refers to those who 
dealt with security and counterterrorism, including heads of the General Security Service.  
Some notable individuals in this group: Ya'akov Peri, Carmi Gilon, and Yossi Ginnosar, 
showed the sharpest awareness of Palestinians’ concerns and were the most disposed to 
finding a workable response. Also in this group are those who held the post of 
coordinator of activities in the territories, such as Maj.Gen. Oren Shachor and Maj.Gen. 
Ya’akov Orr.  In fact, Maj.Gen. Orr was quoted in a Ha’aretz interview regarding policy 
towards the Palestinians as saying, “I don’t agree with the thesis of ‘Let’s squeeze a bit 
more and they’ll give in’.”  He was even known as “the ambassador of Palestine on the 
General Staff” by his fellow officers.78  
The second group of IDF officers with dovish leanings were those engaged in 
political interaction with Palestinians during the peace process.  After officers spent hours 
sharing a table during negotiations they became more cognizant of Palestinians’ needs, 
interests, and attitudes.  Lt.Gen. Ammon Shahak and Maj.Gen. Uzi Dayan are salient 
models of those holding this informed outlook.79  It is important to recognize members in 
these two groups, as they are the most understanding--as well as experienced--men in 
relations with the Palestinians and could be the most beneficial in policy formation.  
Of course there are also hawks in Israel’s military that also have some bearing on 
policy.  In the early 1990s after the first Palestinian Intifada, many in the military 
opposed the plan for a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.  Despite the fact that 
the occupation drained IDF resources, many feared evacuation without a political 
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agreement would be seen as a sign of weakness to motivated Palestinian militants, and 
would bring increased threats and eventually undermine the nation’s very survival.80 
Then as violence and terrorists attacks in Israel became more rampant in the late 1990s, 
much of the support for the peace process in the IDF further waned.81   
Some in the Israeli military establishment prefer a more hard-line policy because 
they see the peace process as undermining deterrence capability. They hold that an 
incompatibility exists between maintaining an effective deterrence strategy and 
simultaneously pursuing a conciliatory policy to reassure Palestinians of Israeli 
moderation.  Segments of the IDF feel a more moderate policy meant to lower tensions 
might be perceived as a loss of Israeli will and resurrect the hope that annihilation of 
Israel is possible.82  Along these lines, there is a strong incentive among the IDF 
leadership to repair the military’s prestige and faith in its abilities as a capable deterrent 
after the unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May of 2000.  They stress the 
importance of this view, as Palestinians are perceived to be attempting a repeat of 
Hizbollah successes.83  However, a hawkish stance can hinder the formulation as well as 
implementation of viable policy avenues.  The importance of understanding Palestinian 
policy preferences in the IDF is two-fold: the military is a major domestic constituency, 
and the military has a huge amount of influence in the foreign policymaking process.   
4. Religion in the IDF 
There are two service categories based on religion in the IDF that could play a 
significant role in Palestinian policymaking in the future. The first is segregated service, 
embodied by the national-religious community--which accounts for around 13 percent of 
Israeli society.  Their attitude towards enlistment is enthusiastic.  For this segment of the 
population, participating in national reconstruction is a holy calling.  Therein, service in 
the military for the basis of defending the ideal of the Jewish state is a religious duty.  
This results in segregated service because national-religious citizens primarily elect to 
serve in the elite reconnaissance (sayeret) units, and more recently as pilots as well. In 
fact, their representation in the IDF is beyond their proportion in the eligible conscript 
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population—perhaps by a ratio of three to one.84  As time marches on and more of this 
group serves in the military and rises through the ranks to senior commanders, “it is liable 
to lead to a radical change in the value-system of the Israeli officer class” to a more hard-
line stance.85  Therefore if this trend continues, and all signs indicate that it will, it could 
have substantial impact on civil-military relations involved in policy formation regarding 
Palestinian issues. 
The second type of service becoming more prevalent among Israeli troops is 
conditional service.  Conditional service refers to those who refuse to carry out orders of 
a certain type in a given location for they feel it would compromise their religious and/or 
ideological beliefs.  In 1993, over a thousand reservists signed a public petition testifying 
that dismantling territories would violate their religious beliefs and would refuse 
summonses to duty.86  Another example is from September 2003, when 27 Israeli pilots 
sent a letter to the Commander of the Air Force notifying him of their refusal to carry out 
strikes in Palestinian areas.  They condemned the orders saying, “We, veteran and active 
pilots... are opposed to carrying out the illegal and immoral attack orders of the sort that 
Israel carries out in the territories.”87  Events like these cause potentially serious 
implications for Israel’s ability to carry out foreign policy originated in the civil branch 
pertaining to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
5. Retired Officers in the Political Arena 
 The military has always been a prevalent recruiting pool for political leadership in 
Israel. The frequent jump of retired officers onto the political scene explains the strong 
military flavor in the Israeli government. ‘Parachuting’--as it is referred to in Israel--has 
provided access for military influence into the civilian political sphere and 
policymaking.88  Just 100 days after they retire from active duty and transition to the 
reserves, officers are allowed to don the political hat. This explains the four-month delay 
before Maj.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz became the current Defense Minister after retiring as 
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CGS.  One remarkable statistic is that since 1967, every single lieutenant-general (the 
highest achievable rank in Israel) has taken on political a role, as have many major-
generals like Ariel Sharon.89  Also, Matan Vilnai, Amnon Lipkin Shahak, and Motta Gur 
were all either recent deputy ministers or key cabinet members. Additional examples of 
high-profile actors that transitioned from Israel’s military culture and into 
decisionmaking include Yigal Yadin, Ezer Weizmann, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon, Ehud 
Barak, and Yitzhak Mordechai -- all former generals who at one point held the portfolios 
of either foreign affairs or defense, and even prime minister.90  For example, Yitzhak 
Rabin, functioned as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense twice, having already 
served as IDF chief of staff.    
 Even when they choose not to formally enter politics, retired officers are often 
involved publicly in political discourse.  For instance, a custom has developed since Oslo.  
Before every election a group of senior reserve officers gather to advertise their 
authoritative judgment about the necessity to retain the territories for national 
preservation.91  On the other hand, in some cases, officers barely out of uniform are 
bolder than civilians in publicizing the importance of the peace process with the 
Palestinians.  For instance, someone who had once been an integral part in the military 
issued statements that could have come from an activist in Peace Now.  In the summer of 
2001, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Ami Ayalon, former commander in chief of the navy and head of 
the GSS, surprised the public when he aired his policy desires.  Ayalon called for 
immediate withdrawal from the territories.92 
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B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
1. Increased Military Influence 
As an active implementer of policy, the military is a major catalyst in embarking 
on the road to peace as well as war.93 In the post Oslo era, with increasing conflict 
involving the Palestinians, Israel’s civil-military balance has shifted more heavily 
towards the military establishment.  The degree of the professional military class 
participation in policymaking varies from an advisory role to an altogether swaying actor.  
For example, when Prime Minister Barak tried to continue diplomatic communications 
with Chairman Yasir Arafat of the Palestinian Authority, Chief of General Staff Mofaz 
publicly called for a more hard-line Palestinian policy.  Incapable of controlling Mofaz 
and other senior officers sharing his views, Barak was pressured into assuming the 
military’s stance -- and cut all ties to the Palestinian leader.94 
The military’s influence on the senior political echelon is exhibited via a number 
of channels. By its status in Israel’s institutional structure, the military is required to 
make continuous input regarding foreign policy. One form of such input involves the 
provision of intelligence assessments and analysis, which contain both subjective and 
objective components – therefore giving the military access points into the 
decisionmaking process.95  Another significant input the military has is its strong 
presence in the cabinet.  Since the 1967 War, it has become the norm for the chief of the 
general staff, and often his deputy and additional senior commanders, and the head of 
military intelligence to attend and contribute in cabinet meetings.  Though they cannot 
cast a formal vote, the military’s voice in political planning has given it substantial 
influence on government decisionmaking.96  
Senior officers have also engaged in the forming of foreign policy by playing a 
central part in negotiations involving the Palestinians, through which their judgments 
have carried great weight with the political leadership.  For instance, Prime Minister 
Rabin invited the deep involvement of high-ranking military officers, rather than their 
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civilian counterparts, in peace process talks.97  Further evidence of the heavy involvement 
of the military in Palestinian negotiations is found in a practice begun with Oslo; 
planning meetings are held at the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv.  Military officers sit side 
by side with government officials as they examine materials in preparation for making 
decisions.  Likewise, this is the same location for forums between all the top brass: the 
prime minister, the government, and the “security cabinet” or “kitchen cabinet” as it has 
come to be called in Israel.  Everyone understands that the politicians have the formal say 
on matters, yet the military exerts influence at every step leading to decisions.  It is 
through this method of approaching Palestinian issues that the military is seen not merely 
as a subordinate or silent partner, but acting in an equivalent capacity as the civilian 
leadership.98 
Another reason for the increased involvement of the military in foreign policy is 
the incentive recognized by policymakers.  They are aware that welcoming the military 
into decisionmaking will likely result in high-ranking officers publicly praising the policy 
they were involved in developing.  The politician will then gain legitimacy and support 
for the policy with the Israeli public.99  This explains another facet of why the military is 
given influence in Israel’s foreign policymaking.  
2. Tail Wagging the Dog 
 Some have claimed the IDF is guilty of fighting a political war with the intent to 
protect the settlements instead of national security, therein forcing the civilian leadership 
into conflict with the Palestinians.100 So far, there have been no incidents of soldiers 
disobeying orders originating from the political leadership or interfering with the 
implementation of policy.  However, during wartime there have been multiple reports of 
the military carrying orders farther than politicians intended or when the IDF only gained 
approval for their actions post facto. Cases of field commanders turning off their radios 
so as not to hear commands coming from the government are recurrent in IDF history, 
even utilized by Ariel Sharon and Ehud Barak. A specific instance where the military was 
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accused of pursuing its own agenda instead of the government’s was when the IDF 
attacked the party of Mohammed Dahlan, preventive security chief in the Gaza Strip, 
when he departed with a group of Israeli representatives after security talks with the 
Palestinian Authority.  However, these and other instances have been defended as 
miscommunications or mistakes on the part of soldiers.101 On the other hand, some within 
the IDF have complained the military is being used by the civilians to protect ideological 
extremists in the territories.   
 Another example in 2001 is worthy of mention. It concerned plans regarding the 
“buffer zone” (the area along the “green line”) blocking passage via a fence and 
pronouncing it a closed military zone.  It is unclear whether the plan had military 
benefits, but certainly carried political implications.  Putting the buffer zone into effect 
would indicate Israel had given up on reaching an agreement with the Palestinian 
Authority. Furthermore, the buffer zone would likely create another security zone similar 
to that inside the territories in southern Lebanon, which had been a cause of steady 
conflict and criticism.  For these reasons, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon firmly opposed the 
plan and had decided not to move forward on it. However, while Sharon was traveling to 
Russia, he received word that the chief of general staff was about to hold a press 
conference unveiling the buffer zone plan.  Sharon was furious and immediately put a 
stop to the press conference and told the journalists on his plane that the CGS had 
forgotten who set Israeli foreign policy.102  This author does not believe the defense 
establishment to be a monolithic body.  Therefore a combination of both occurs—
sometimes the military acts in its own interests, and other times the civilians use the 
military to accomplish theirs. 
3. Civil-Military Relations in Conflict 
Since Oslo there have been disputes between the military establishment and the 
civilian government in Israel.  The split became more pronounced in 1996 when the 
political Right in Netanyahu’s government charged the IDF with putting a stop to the 
ongoing Palestinian attacks on Israeli citizens.103  However, the IDF has been perceived 
as unable to deliver the goods.  Consequently the prime minister, other ministers and 
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Knesset members, such as the chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 
have expressed a lack of confidence in the chief of staff and senior military leadership.104 
The military high command has responded that it cannot halt the killings of 
innocent Israelis, for the methods required would far exceed those acceptable by Western 
democracies and normative codes of Israeli society.105 The IDF therefore complains that 
the political echelon assigns it tasks that are subject to constraints preventing the 
fulfillment of its policy objectives.  These ideas have been voiced in recent years by 
several chiefs of staff.  For example, Maj.Gen. Dan Shomron who was in command 
during the Intifada, argued that all the IDF could do was limit the violence, not eradicate 
it altogether.  Ultimately, he saw the only way to stop the Palestinian attacks was through 
a political solution.106   
In fact, several times in 1997 high-ranking officers rejected calls for aggressive 
action raised by the political echelon, especially Prime Minister Netanyahu.   Where once 
it was the military that pushed for military action in reaction to Arab armies or 
Palestinian aggression, the IDF now found itself in a moderating role, restraining 
“Netanyahu’s adventurous initiatives.”107 
After internal debates turned up fruitless, both sides often cast disgruntled jabs at 
the other in the press, thus airing their disputes in front of the Israeli public.  The clash 
over policy between the political and military branches had become so fierce that in the 
1999 elections, tens of recently retired generals joined opposition parties or formed new 
ones, with a single mission: to overthrow the reigning government, and they 
succeeded.108 In doing so, they also satisfied a corporate interest by installing a former 
military leader, which Netanyahu was not.  Many following civil-military matters in 
Israel over the past decade have noted all the above indications as leading to a crisis in 
relations between senior military officers and political elites.   
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C. CONCLUSION 
The IDF is a domestic component of foreign policymaking.  This is a fact 
international negotiators need to keep in mind.  Given the abundance of Israeli citizens 
associated with military service, the IDF has become a collective characteristic of Israeli 
society and impacts civil-military relations.  With the preeminence assigned to national 
security in Israel, the defense establishment will continue to have a heavy hand in foreign 
policy formation.  Therein it is vital for U.S. policymakers to understand Israel’s 
priorities to know how to best collaborate with their ally.   
Differing views on Palestinian policy as well as religious preferences within the 
IDF will also be a significant factor shaping future civil-military relations in Israel.  
Policymakers in Washington need to identify which IDF leaders most agree with 
American interests and work with them.  Furthermore, the military background of Israel’s 
past and present political leadership means decisionmaking in areas encompassing 
Palestinian issues with continue to have a pronounced military flavor.  
The IDF’s influence on policy formation, due to the intertwining nature of civil-
military relations, will keep increasing.  This is due to the reality that the military is used 
by the government for policy planning, negotiations, and the implementation of policy 
with the Palestinians.  This is why it is so critical for U.S. policymakers to get their hands 
around the IDF and its role in the civil-military partnership in Israel.   
Tension between the political and military elites over Palestinian plans may reach 
a critical point if the government requests the IDF to carry out orders of which is it 
incapable because the methods needed are perceived as unacceptable.  Jockeying between 
military and political elites can be just as important as any foreign ministry or prime 
minister desires.  Conflict should be recognized and assessed for true difference over 
policy or as a political ploy.  All the above factors are evidence that the military is an 
important source of domestic influence on Israel’s foreign policy. 
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IV.  SOCIETY 
For most countries in the Middle East, a study of their political system and civil-
military relations would be sufficient to understand the domestic drivers on foreign 
policymaking.  The majority of countries in this region of the world are run by exclusive 
regimes and the armed forces alone; average citizens have little or no influence on state 
behavior.  In contrast, to get a full picture of the possible domestic influences on 
decisionmaking in Israel, a third layer must be discussed – society at large.  Societal 
factors need to be understood as they spill over into the political system in Israel as well 
as the military establishment.   
Israel is by no means a society of singular voice, there are many internal debates 
going to the very core of the peace process with the Palestinians.  There are differing 
opinions as to Israel’s national identity, as well as religious, communal, and subcultural 
divisions.  Furthermore, as a liberal democratic society, Israel has very active interest 
groups, clearly defined public opinion, and a free press. All these societal aspects have 
varying objectives and potential to play an important part in the Palestinian policy Israel 
pursues.  A comprehensive assessment of Israel’s foreign policymaking process would be 
incomplete without an examination of influential elements in the wider population.  It 
must be noted there is difficulty in dealing with this aspect of Israel’s domestic inputs to 
foreign policy.  The impact of any part of society is hard to measure quantitatively and it 
is extremely problematic to draw direct causal relationships between policies made.   
 The main cleavages that compose the societal mosaic in Israel are communal 
groups – mainly Ashkenazi and Mizrachim Jews, Russian Immigrants, and Arabs. 
Various subcultures also exist -- from Ultra-Orthodox Jews to the growing secular sector, 
as well as subgroups of ultra-nationalists and settlers.  Each has their own vision as to 
how Israeli national identity ought to be defined.109  The disputes over national identity 
and foreign policy preferences are causally connected.  The peace process with the 
Palestinians is not simply a territorial matter; it is fundamental to character of Israel.  For 
a mobilized religious component of society, Judea and Samaria are part of Israel’s soul.  
To revisionist Zionists, a peace process with withdrawals is a return to exile and threatens 
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the very notion of Zionism.  For leftist Israelis and secular Jews in general, the territories 
pose a stumbling block to growth and retaining a democratic state.110  
 Israeli politicians are aware of these conflicting viewpoints and try to find a 
delicate balance to formulate foreign policy.  However, the constant disagreement over 
national identity, with its religious-secular divide and communal and cultural rifts, hinder 
the political leadership in building the support needed for an acceptable Palestinian 
policy.111 Defining national identity and coordinating it with Israeli nationalism, religious 
considerations, and calls for peace, pose one of the greatest obstacles for Israel in the 
twenty-first century.112   
A. COMMUNAL GROUPS 
 Israeli society is derived from a variety of backgrounds resulting from waves of 
immigration.  Each communal group is a piece of the political puzzle, where “one of the 
dominant criteria is ethnicity, not the Jewish and non-Jewish distinction, but intra-Jewish 
ethnicity.”113 The surprising success of Sephardim, Russian, and Arab-Israeli parties in 
the 1996 elections initiated the belief that communal groups were beginning to define the 
core of Israeli society.114 
1. Ashkenazi and Mizrachim 
 The two major communal groups are the Ashkenazi Jews who originated from 
America and Europe, and the Mizrachim (Orientals in Hebrew) Jews, previously referred 
to as Sephardim, who immigrated from North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  By 
1996, the Ashkenazim had grown to 50% of the electorate while the Mizrachim went 
down to 39%.  Oren Yiftachel has traced a relationship between support for the peace 
process with the Palestinians and the socio-economic status of these two communities.  It 
is often regarded that the peace process benefits the middle and upper Ashkenazim 
classes, who prefer a conciliatory foreign policy as a means to advance their own 
commercial interests and to attract foreign investors to a calmer Israel.  The Mizrachim 
however, perceive they have been excluded from any economic benefits of the peace 
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process.  This has lead to an indifferent outlook, and sometimes fierce opposition to 
territorial concessions by Oriental Jews.115  
2. Russian Immigrants 
 During the 1990s more than three quarter of a million Jews from the former 
Soviet Union immigrated to Israel and greatly changed the dynamic of society, as the 
most secular wave ever. By 1996, Russian immigrants constituted roughly 20% of the 
Israeli population, and serious political pull. Not only are the Russians a voting resource, 
they are a highly political people.  They demonstrated this by forming their own party, 
Israel b’Aliya, just months before the 1996 election and still captured seven Knesset 
seats.116 Israel b’Aliya was a crucial party to the ruling coalition, not only for its number 
of Knesset seats, but more importantly due to its open-mindedness on foreign policy 
issues -- such as fate of the territories, because their vote was driven more by economics 
than ideology.117  However, the more recent 2001 and 2003 election results showed a 
trend of decreased Russian immigrant political power in the parliament and coalition 
politics.  The magnitude of influence this community will sustain in Israel’s 
policymaking remains to be seen. 
3. Arab-Israelis 
 For decades any national ethnic-based Arab political organization or protest 
movement was suffocated in Israel. Over time, Israeli-Arabs have accumulated 
considerable material wealth and political potential.  For example, Prime Minister Rabin 
included two Arab parties in his coalition, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, 
and the United Arab List.118  Arab parties increased their Knesset seats from five in 1992 
to 10 in 1999; additionally three Arabs were elected to the Knesset on the lists of other 
parties.  However, greater parliamentary representation has failed to translate into added 
political influence for Arabs.  They were excluded from both Netanyahu’s and Barak’s 
governments, and no Arab has ever served as a cabinet minister.119  Still, the fact that the 
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Arab community exists makes them a domestic constituency every Israeli policymaker 
must take into account. 
B. SUBCULTURES 
A culture often contains numerous subcultures.  A subculture is a social group 
within a national culture that has distinctive patterns of behavior and beliefs.  These 
distinctions can be derived from ethnic background, religion, or other factors that serve to 
unify the group.  Israel’s culture is made up of shared national experiences involving a 
heightened sensitivity to national security from ongoing conflict with its Arab neighbors 
and a degree of Jewish heritage. On a more micro-level Israel is fragmented into various 
diverse subcultures.  
Competing values of liberalism, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism 
dictate the public forum--and policy.  Therein another variable in Israel’s foreign policy 
equation is the political efforts of different subcultures, since these subgroups are active 
in the political sphere.120 As a result, it is important to grasp the impact certain 
subcultures within Israel have on the formulation of the nation’s foreign policy.  
1. Secular Jews 
The religious-secular divide has become more pronounced in Israel during the last 
decade, as the gap between the political left and right has deepened.121  The dichotomy in 
approaching foreign policy with the Palestinians between the religious and the secular 
segments of society has become a source of political polarization in Israel.  Foreign 
policy preferences among secular Israelis differ and are motivated by a mixture of 
factors.   
Many secular Jews favor withdrawal from the territories and advancing the peace 
process to serve Israeli interests in economic growth, water and other resources, 
“normalcy”, technological and cultural progress, and the like.122 Also, this subgroup is 
most sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians and the impoverished living conditions 
they suffer in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Other secular Jews want to give up land out of a concern for maintaining Israel’s 
democratic and Jewish nature.  Growing awareness of the imminent ‘demographic 
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problem’ among Israelis is intensifying a sense of urgency in relations with the 
Palestinians.  As of 2003, one quarter of a million Jews live alongside three million 
Palestinians in the territories, and currently Palestinians make up 20% of the Israeli 
population.  The higher birthrates of Israeli Arabs on both sides of the Green Line raises a 
red flag to Jewish Israelis that even immigration cannot lower.123  The reality has set in 
that by 2015, Jewish and Arab populations will be equal.124   
However secular Jews cannot by any stretch be typecast.  Many secular Jews 
believe that Israel is engaged in a battle for survival with the Arabs and must prevent 
annihilation by maintaining Israeli superiority in the region.   A couple glaring examples 
of secular Jews staunchly in the securitist camp are the current Prime Minister Sharon 
and former premier Netanyahu.  
2. Haredim and Ultra-Orthodox 
 Ultra-Orthodox Jewry has traditionally only focused on domestic issues relating 
to religious observance in Israel.  However, since Oslo even strictly observant religious 
Jews have taken a keen interest in foreign policy and are overall opposed to Israeli 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians. To the haredim, Judea and Samaria (The West 
Bank) are religiously significant to Israel.  Ultra-orthodox Jews fervently support right-
wing religious parties and have an impressive ability to mobilize the population during 
elections.125  In fact, it is rare that one of their parties has not been included in the 
government’s coalition, giving the haredim substantial political leverage.  
 On the other hand, some rabbis in strictly orthodox groups affiliated with the 
political party United Torah Judaism, have reasoned that achieving peace might warrant 
surrendering the territories Israel has occupied since the War of 1967.  One illustration is 
Rabbi Moshe Taragin, who believes the settler colonies are part of the divine plan 
ultimately resulting in the coming of the Messiah.  Yet, in regards to Sharon’s Gaza 
disengagement plan, Rabbi Taragin said that the possibility that an exchange of land 
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“would serve a peaceful environment deserved attention.” He further explained, “We’re 
willing to allow pragmatism to temper our messianism.”126 
3. Religious-National 
 Ultra-nationalists have a strong hold in religious-Zionist circles and maintain that 
a Greater Israel under Jewish control is not only needed for reasons of security, but 
additionally a religious commandment to be obeyed.  Occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip has paved the way for the nationalization of religion to occur, combining 
national and religious extremism.127  Dissatisfied with Rabin’s handling of Israel’s 
identity crisis after Oslo, ultra-nationalist and Orthodox Jews intensified their policy 
advocacy efforts and joined forces to increase their political pursuits.128  The National 
Religious Party is the main representative of this subculture and has faired well in Israeli 
governments.   
4. Settlers 
Tens of thousands of Israelis have erected settlements in the territories captured in 
the 1967 War.  Israeli settlers believe holding the land is a holy calling.  For them, the 
settlements symbolize the fruition of prophesy for God’s people.129  Settlers fear the 
Premier’s policy for a withdrawal from Gaza would start Israel down a slippery slope.  
 The Settlers have actively and persistently expressed to the current Likud 
government their outrage over the prime ministers planned evacuation from Gaza and the 
northern West Bank. And with marked success -- it has yet to win approval despite 
repeated attempts and will likely cost Sharon his coalition. One Israeli journalist aptly 
explained the settlers’ secret to success in influencing the national agenda: “While they 
are a small minority, they are highly motivated, well organized with a firm ideology and 
enormous financial resources – some directly from government ministries – and driven 
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with a messianic passion.”130  The settlers are unified with a focused vision to retain the 
territories and have proven determined enough to back up their words with action.  
C. INTEREST GROUPS 
An interest group is an organization or other collective of people who share a 
specific cause. They operate on behalf of a certain interest, often in aims to bring about a 
political result.  This chapter will discuss interest groups or grassroots movements that 
stand for separate ideological, ethnic, or religious positions regarding Israeli-Palestinian 
relations that pressure Israel’s foreign policymaking process.  
In Israel, a small group of influential actors determine foreign policy, and groups 
try to affect these key decisionmakers.131  As a liberal democracy, Israel’s political 
leadership is forced to be responsive to a wide range of interest groups.  Furthermore, 
Israeli political system provides various avenues through which these groups can limit or 
assist in determining the nation’s foreign policy.  Israeli foreign policy then is dependent 
upon the impact of key groups that define the environment in which political leaders 
operate.  An understanding of the most influential groups in Israel is therefore necessary 
for an analysis of foreign policies ultimately formulated.132  
 Israel has a flourishing civil society with numerous interest groups that function 
throughout the range of national public and political opinion. The Histadrut, Peace Now, 
Dor Shalom, Gush Shalom, and Mateh Ha’rov are among the most significant groups that 
encourage the peace process with the Palestinians.  While Gush Emunim, the Yesha 
Council, and Women in Green comprise some of the most powerful examples of those 
supporting the idea of Greater Israel. 
1. Histadrut 
The Histadrut is a workers’ organization dedicated to the pursuit of Zionist goals 
and the exclusive employment of Jewish workers in Israel. The Histadrut has always 
backed settlement within the context of a peace agreement.  The group supports the 
government’s foreign policy, although it is unhappy with the size of the defense budget 
and sees large military spending as a burden to Israel’s economy.  Therefore, the 
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Histadrut leans more towards accommodation in regards to the settlements than either the 
wider population or government coalitions.133   
2. Peace Now 
Peace Now is one of the most recognized, active, and largest, interest groups in 
Israel. According to their website, “Peace Now is a movement of Israeli citizens who 
view peace, compromise and reconciliation with the Palestinians people…as the only 
guarantee for the future, the security, and the character of the State of Israel.”134  Peace 
Now aims to put a stop to Israeli militant occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and 
proposes the establishment of a Palestinian state.135  Since Oslo, the movement has 
supported governments with a “land for peace” position.  Currently, Peace Now leaders 
support Prime Minister Sharon’s withdrawal plan, even over negotiations.136   
However, the movement has mobilized against governments that have hindered 
the peace process and has coordinated its protests with political parties.  Peace Now has 
close ties with leading doves in Labor and their activists have been very involved in 
supporting the party’s election campaigns.  The movement has also succeeded in getting 
its own members elected to the Knesset on lists of Labor and other parties.137   
3. Dor Shalom and Gush Shalom 
 Dor Shalom was founded in the mid-1990s in the aftermath of Prime Minister 
Rabin’s assassination.  It is a non-partisan group advocating peace with the Palestinians 
to create a just, tolerant and democratic Jewish state. Dor Shalom’s resources come from 
contributions as well as professional fundraising.  In 1998, its membership constituted 
more than 25,000 Israelis.138 
 Gush Shalom’s political views are three fold: immediate withdrawal of all settlers 
and the IDF from territories occupied since 1967, the establishment of a sovereign 
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and Israeli admission of guilt for 
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tragedy experienced by Palestinian refugees and recognizing in principle the right of 
return.139  Gush Shalom believes these terms will allow for both parties to reach a 
peaceful solution. 
4. Mateh Ha’rov 
 One of the rising stars in Israel’s current peace movement is Mateh Ha’rov 
(Coalition of the Majority) and combines members from other tents in the peace camp 
such as Peace Now, Labor, Histadrut, kibbutz, and leftist youth organizations.  Some 
dissention exists within the group over whether a unilateral step towards peace is putting 
the best foot forward.  Though they have agreed on an interim solution best summarized 
by their umbrella slogan, “Get out of Gaza and Begin to Talk.”140  The most remarkable 
achievement of this new movement was the organization of a demonstration in May 2004 
at Rabin Square in Tel Aviv. The rally was a response to the Likud rejection of Prime 
Minister Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan and was attended by more than 150,000 
peaceniks.   
5. Gush Emunim 
 Gush Emunim, literally “bloc of the faithful,” is an interest group of religious 
professing and practicing Jews.  They believe Jews should hold the land of Israel without 
remorse or self-doubt as they did in Old Testament times. Gush Emunim is on the front 
lines of those fighting to expand Israeli settlements and control over the territories.  The 
movement’s success and effectiveness in the political sphere can be attributed to focusing 
on a sole policy issue – the borders of Israel. Gush Emunim is among the most 
resourceful, determined, and efficient pressure groups in Israeli politics.141  They 
maintain strong ties with Likud, reinforcing each other’s political goals. Through such 
means, Gush Emunim has gained significant access into Israeli foreign policy.   
Religious jargon alone is insufficient to justify the settlements and occupation of 
the territories to a largely secular Israeli society.  Therefore, Gush Emunim has 
incorporated modern secular, national, and militaristic rhetoric into their messianic 
ideology to transform the collective Israeli consciousness.  This has added to the 
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movement’s political and cultural power to realize its mission of controlling Great Israel. 
The integration of a sweeping array of ideals also benefited Sharon’s aspirations in 
broadening the constituency supporting him at the ballot box.142  
6. Yesha Council 
 The Yesha Council represents Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
and many consider it the most powerful pressure group in Israeli politics.  The Yesha 
Council’s political leverage far outweighs its size in society, and a large number of 
Knesset members are sympathetic to its cause.143  The Israeli government recognizes the 
Yesha Council as a force to be reckoned with.  For example, it de-legitimized the 
government in its efforts during Oslo II.  Yesha Council organized anti-government 
demonstrations and cooperated with opposition parties to portray the peace process as 
abandoning Israel’s most precious interests and values.144  Consequently, today Yesha 
Council leadership is able to schedule meetings with political elites (for example, with 
both the Public Security Minister and Defense Minister in recent months) giving them 
direct access to policymaking in Israel.145 
7. Women in Green 
 Women for Israel’s tomorrow (Women in Green) was founded in 1993 and ever 
since has been one of the most rapidly growing grassroots movements in Israeli society.  
The organization consists of women who share love, devotion, and concern for Israel. 
Women in Green’s sole concern is that Israel remain a Jewish state.  Though they are not 
affiliated with any political party, they organize public demonstrations, advertise in 
newspapers, and provide lectures to educate the electorate on the consequences of Israel’s 
foreign policy regarding Palestinians.146   
Women in Green has always been vocal, but has increasingly been in the public 
spotlight ever since Prime Minister Sharon announced his plan to withdraw from Gaza 
and parts of the West Bank earlier this year.  Recently government authorities have 
reported a spike in extremist remarks and threats of violence. Women in Green is partly 
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responsible.  In a June 2004 media release, Ruth Matar co-founder of this right-wing 
movement called Prime Minister Sharon “one of the most dangerous men for the survival 
of Israel.” She argues that “Sharon is caving in to Arab terror and joining forces to realize 
the fondest dreams of the Arabs, namely to drive the Jewish people out of their Promised 
Land.” Matar slung further insults to undermine the premier’s foreign policy by calling 
him “a lackey of foreign powers, instead of fighting for the interests of his own 
people.”147   
Another highly publicized incident occurred in September 2004, when a criminal 
investigation was launched into remarks made by Nadia Matar, also co-chairman of 
Women in Green.  She is suspected of comparing Israel’s preparations to pull out of Gaza 
to the acts of Nazi Germany.  Matar said, “I will continue to scream out against this plan 
which essentially is giving in to the Arab-Nazi enemy and presents a danger for the state 
of Israel.”148 
D. PUBLIC OPINION 
 Two weeks after some 60,000 Likud Party members voted against Prime Minister 
Sharon’s withdrawal plan from Gaza in May 2004, 150,000 Israelis packed Rabin Square 
in Tel Aviv, appealing to the government to move forward with the pullout.149  This is a 
clear cut example that goes to the very core of contrasting Israeli opinions today.  With 
fresh international endeavors by the U.S. and Europe to reinvigorate the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process (The Quartet Roadmap), pressure is mounting within Israel.150  
Domestic developments place tremendous pressure on Israel to reconsider its relationship 
to the Palestinians and determine the acceptable risks for peace.   
Polls provide a mapping of public opinion, and public opinion can influence 
policy as leaders try to make decisions that will preserve or enhance their image.  The 
following section will examine Israeli survey results on specific issues pertaining to the 
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country’s foreign policy, namely: security, the settlements, unilateral withdrawal from the 
territories, establishment of a Palestinian state, and attitudes toward the peace process.  
Israeli society exhibits symptoms of weariness towards the protracted conflict 
with the Palestinians and is increasingly concerned about security.  In 2002, 42% thought 
Arabs wanted to kill as many Jews as possible, and an additional 26% thought they 
wanted to destroy the state of Israel – combined totaling 68%.  Furthermore, Israelis were 
more concerned for their personal safety as well as the nations, with 92% expressing fear 
that they, or a family member would sufferer a terrorist attack.151  As evidenced by the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the suicide bombings that many attribute to 
Netanyahu’s success in 1996, terrorism has weakened the sense of security.  Calls for 
moderation are hushed by cries for security, thus weakening support for conciliatory 
attitudes.152  For instance, when Operation Defensive Shield was launched by the IDF in 
March 2002 to attack the Palestinian terror infrastructure, it was widely approved by the 
Israeli public--even in the pro-peace camp.  
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are a major bone of 
contention in contemporary Israeli society.  Historically many Israelis have been 
somewhat indifferent to the settlements.  Yet, by 2003 most were clearly unsympathetic.  
A clear majority favored a freezing of the settlements and 70% believed the government 
should use aggressive measures against Jewish extremists refusing to leave.  In fact, 53% 
thought the government was not being tough enough on the settlers.  Data showed 63% of 
Israelis are ready to trade most of the settlements in West Bank and Gaza for a peace 
agreement with the Palestinians.153  
The recent trend in Israeli opinion has moved toward separation to make 
defending the border easier and as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Not only 
has there been a rise in support for a unilateral withdrawal from the territories – the scales 
have tipped.  In 2003, 56% of Israelis backed the notion of separating from the 
Palestinians via a unilateral withdrawal, even if it meant abandoning the settlements. This 
opinion was up from 48% in 2002.154   
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 While public expectations have changed an acceptance of policy alternatives has 
developed.  A two-state solution is no longer an untouchable subject in Israeli politics.155  
Public opinion polls in 1999 showed that 69% thought a Palestinian state was inevitable, 
and what’s more – 55% of Israelis said the Palestinians deserve sovereignty.156  In 2003, 
59% preferred the establishment of a Palestinian state if it would render a peace 
agreement.157 
 The fact that 82% of the public backed Netanyahu’s first meeting with Yasir 
Arafat, and 80% favored continuing negotiations with the Palestinians signifies that 
Israelis have undergone a paradigm shift in their view of the peace process and want 
policy to advance it.158 By 2003, 56% of the Israeli public chose focusing on peace talks, 
while 44% preferred the use of military might as the best policy to deter Palestinian 
violence.  Similarly, Israeli society had become more optimistic about the peace process. 
Only 54% thought a peace agreement with the Palestinians was out of reach, compared to 
68% in 2002.159  
 An important statistic to U.S. policymakers involved Israeli views towards 
participation by outside partners.  Albeit a small majority, 52% felt a solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be reached through third party intervention, that the 
parties must work it out themselves. Unfortunately 68% were against the U.S. imposing 
an agreement on the parties, although at least a decline from 80% in 2002.  Despite the 
two opinions above, some good news can be found in that 66% trusted American 
guarantees of security.160  
E. MEDIA 
 One of the fundamental principles of a democracy is that its people must have the 
freedom to deliberate over important current affairs. The Israeli media has become the 
central stage for internal debates over Palestinian policy, and their coverage encourages 
public discussion. The debate takes place in news stories, editorials, talks shows, and the 
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entertainment media.161  It is important to note that Israel is a news-captivated society, 
proven by data on subscription levels to newspapers and ratings for television and radio 
news programs.162  Therefore, the media can be considered a domestic access point into 
foreign policy formation as it shapes how issues are portrayed.   
 One prevalent illustration of a domestic media source with influence on 
politicians and the pubic alike is Ha’aretz.  Ha’aretz is an independent daily newspaper 
with liberal coverage of Israeli domestic issues and international affairs. The paper plays 
a substantial part in forming public opinion and is closely read by those in the 
government’s decisionmaking circles.  Many of the writers hail from senior military and 
political backgrounds and are respected as coming from an informed position.  As a 
result, they are taken seriously and trusted by their earlier colleagues and keep close 
personal ties with Israel’s leaders.163  The paper is perhaps most popular for its Op-ed 
section.  One such article shows the media framing how an issue is perceived:  
The Gaza settlements are the height of absurdity, hubris of outrageous 
dimensions.  Despite all the billions that have been invested in the area, 
only 7,500 Jews live in 20 isolated venues and have no chance of 
surviving without an enormous military presence protecting them.  It’s a 
brutal occupation that has given a third of the land including water 
resources, to those 7,500 people, while 1.3 million Arabs live on 65 
percent of the land in terribly overcrowded conditions and horrifying 
poverty.  This occupation threatens the existence of the state.  Every 
reasonable person understands that the situation cannot go on forever 
without some terrible explosion.164  
 
The media is involved in several levels of the foreign policymaking process.  
Political elites take the media into account when they form their policy.  The media 
creates an environment where foreign policy related events are portrayed in an agenda-
setting light.  This affects decisionmakers and in turn obliges them to respond in the 
media.  Also, the media can serve as a mobilizing force when reporters notify the public 
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of foreign policy-related news, and journalists provide commentary and analysis. 165 
Therefore, the media is a domestic constituency.  Two schools of thought exist when it 
comes to the character of the media’s influence on the peace process:  supportive and 
destructive.   
The first position is captured by Chanan Naveh, who describes the media with 
potential to benefit the peace process. In a mobilizing function, the media recruits support 
for the government - critical during the pursuit of peace.  Political leadership can use the 
press to build consensus for their policies.  Therein, the media’s role as a promoter of 
policy debates can sway public opinion in favor of advancing the peace process.  
However, Naveh admits the media can also act against a government trying to improve 
Israeli-Palestinian relations.166 
Gadi Wolfsfeld agrees the news media is central to the peace process, yet in a 
detrimental manner.  A lasting peace needs time to develop; yet the media demands 
immediate results. Similarly, peace has the best chance of success in a calm environment, 
however the press feeds off of violence and turmoil.  Peace processes consist of long 
complicated negotiations, often requiring strict discretion.  Opponents to peace can then 
fill the silence by replacing the excitement the media lacks from government sources.167 
Since Oslo, media coverage of every terrorist attack has perpetuated the argument 
that giving into the Palestinians results in added violence.  For instance, in 1995 after 
civilian Israelis were killed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the media indulged in 
“marathons of mourning” of around-the-clock call in shows, constant playing of gloomy 
music, and vivid funeral exposure.  It is extraordinarily challenging to pursue long-term 
policy in such an intensely emotional atmosphere. Israelis demanded the government “do 
something.” Calls for revenge against the Palestinians sounded as support for the peace 
process fell to a whisper.  Another example of the media thwarting the peace process was 
in 2000 after the failure of Camp David to result in an agreement. The media portrayed 
Palestinians as murderous terrorists and caused Israelis to view them as dishonest 
negotiating partners. The media tends to sensationalize events to serve their monetary 
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interests, which unfortunately has a negative impact on an already problematic peace 
process.168  
F. CONCLUSION 
 Any Israeli government wishing to promote a peace agreement to greater society 
will have to not only deal with how the policy will strengthen security, but its 
implications on the national identity.169  Despite one’s personal views, not a single Israeli 
can escape the demographic facts.  Both advocates and opponents of a withdrawal policy 
must accept that Jewish settlement in the territories is quickly reaching a critical juncture. 
170  Therefore, it is important to ascertain which elements in Israeli society have the most 
access to the foreign policymaking process. The constituents with the least impact are 
communal groups, public opinion, and the media.  The most significant components are 
certain subcultures, which in turn usually participate in correlated right-wing interest 
groups. 
 The different communal groups are a bloc of which the policymaker need be 
aware. They are fairly segregated and generally share the same political outlooks as a 
community with certain circumstances that bind them together.  However, it does not 
appear any of the communal groups have forcefully tried to influence Palestinian policy 
as a group.  
 With respect to public opinion, one question is outstanding – why doesn’t it have 
any influence?! One would think in a democracy, if the majority of Israelis want to make 
peace with the Palestinians, the government would have to submit to the will of the 
people.  A possible explanation is that policymakers have mainly sought to marshal 
public opinion in support of policies only after they are made, instead of looking to public 
opinion for direction.171   
In 2000, as the Hizbullah attacks on Israeli troops in Lebanon ranged on and death 
tolls mounted, the domestic cry for immediate unilateral withdrawal grew louder and 
louder. Eventually Prime Minister Barak was forced to respond to public demands and 
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brought the IDF home.172  Here public opinion directly changed policy.  The prospect 
worth contemplating is, given the public opinion presented above, will Sharon be 
compelled to follow suit and proceed with his unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza 
and parts of the West Bank? Or maybe the Israeli public will get so frustrated with the 
Right after failed attempts to move forward in the peace process they will vote in a new 
government that will adhere to and accommodate the desires of the majority. 
 Regarding the two arguments about the impact of the media on foreign policy in 
Israel, the side that portrays the media as a negative factor is more plausible.  The media 
by nature perpetuates conflict.  It also molds public opinion as it shapes how policies are 
relayed.  It is important for policymakers to develop better plans to consider and relate to 
the media when they make decisions and consider promulgating foreign policy.   
 The various subcultures within Israel can sometimes be involved in 
decisionmaking.  Secular Jews are driven by concerns over the economy, human rights, 
demographics, and security.  As such a diversified group, secular Jews have found it 
difficult to mobilize, hence their political influence has remained limited. The religious-
nationalists, as previously discussed in Chapter III, are active in the IDF and therefore 
civil-military relations giving them a degree of access to policy formulation.  They also 
hold strong political convictions, which make any benefits Israel might gain from a peace 
agreement an insufficient tradeoff to a group wholly committed to Jewish control over 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 173 The settler subculture is one of the most potent 
forces in determining Israeli-Palestinian policy. The fact that the settlers have still been 
able to dominate Israel’s policymaking process—even when public opinion favors a 
withdrawal from the territories and advancing the peace process—makes it appear that no 
peace movement can overcome their political clout.174  The haredim are showing a 
growing interest in foreign policy and their thriving participation in Israeli politics 
certainly give them access to policy outputs.  More recently the haredim lack unity in 
their approach to Palestinian issues, though mainly still believe the territories hold 
religious value.   
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  Interest groups in Israel are flourishing; in terms of whether they have an input, it 
varies. The Histadrut is certainly a major player in domestic economic policy.  However, 
Organized Labor’s track record suggests they refrain from getting involved in foreign 
policy, though this could possibly change if a particular policy had a direct adverse 
impact.  With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000 to present), support for Peace 
Now has fizzed out.  Dor Shalom and Gush Shalom appear to be in more of supportive 
role than as headlining the peace movement.  Mateh Ha’rov is too new to fully evaluate 
the magnitude of their input on foreign policy. But, the May 2004 peace demonstration 
they organized rallying over a hundred thousand Israelis is certainly a respectable 
accomplishment.  If it can sustain a similar level of activity and transform it into direct 
political persuasion, the emerging movement’s influence could be substantial.  
Interest groups associated with the right are much more influential.  Gush 
Emunim and the Yesha Council are without question very involved in Israeli 
decisionmaking, both within and outside the political system.  They are the most fervent 
pursuers of their policy positions to political elites.  Even though they only comprise a 
small percentage of the population, they have a large amount of input on issues relating to 
the Palestinians. Sharon’s plan to unilaterally dismantle the settlements and withdraw the 
troops that protect them is clearly guided by the idea of Greater Israel.  However, 
Sharon’s vision is founded in terms of security, not the messianic beliefs of Gush 
Emunim.  For a long time in Israel “these two ideologies overlapped.  But presently they 
are diverging, and could pose a threat to the settlers’ hegemony.”175  Women in Green 
have a high profile, massive efforts to further their cause, and as evidenced by the 
investigation mentioned earlier – are taken seriously by the government.  They have 
considerable potential for contribution in foreign policy.  
An extremely interesting phenomenon is that the right-wing interest groups are 
always taken into the fold during a Likud government.  However, the peace movements 
do not enjoy the same status when Labor leads Israel. It is unclear exactly why this 
occurs, but undoubtedly has a tremendous impact on Palestinian related issues.  Perhaps 
the Right has more staying power than the peace-camp because they are more radicalized, 
driven, and unified.   
                                                 
175 Neve Gordon, “The Militarist and Messianic Ideologies.” 
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  The evaluation of all the members that make up Israeli society is vital in building 
a comprehensive representation of the domestic drivers influencing the nation’s foreign 
policy today.  This study brought to light which were most important, and why.  Since 
some of the findings were counterintuitive, it is helpful for U.S. policymakers to be 
familiar with Israeli beliefs, rationale, and motivations.  Given the discoveries of 
significant actors in Israeli society—as well as the political sphere and civil-military 
relations—an overall ranking of the three areas combined will be presented in the 
following chapter.  Additionally, recommendations for U.S policymakers will be offered 
pertaining to what was learned about driving forces in Israel for promoting the peace 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Yasir Arafat’s recent death opened a window of opportunity to advance the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Since Arafat’s passing, there has been cooperation 
between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.  They plan to continue working together 
towards PA elections and the Israeli pullout from Gaza in 2005.  Newfound hope exists 
that these fresh circumstances will jumpstart the stalled road map.   
All the components discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis were needed 
to ascertain the most important domestic access points to Israel’s foreign policy 
formation.  Israel’s political arena, military, and society overlap and interact immensely 
in this regard. A look into Israel’s political system showed the relative importance of 
elections, political parties, the Knesset, coalitions, and the prime minister.  Focusing on 
the IDF and civil-military relations in Israel demonstrated: national security concerns 
dictate foreign policy, the significance of different Palestinian policy views within the 
military, the growing role of the defense establishment government decisionmaking, the 
influence of retired officers entering politics, and highlighted conflict between military 
and political elites.  An examination of Israeli society illustrated the power of communal 
groups and subcultures, interest groups, the media, and clearly identified the heartbeat of 
Israeli opinion.  A great deal has been learned though the presentation in earlier chapters 
of all these internal issues and their bearing on Israel’s relations with the Palestinians and 
had to be covered to discover which elements were most dominant.   
 The point of this conclusion is to clarify what was learned, to ascertain which 
domestic drivers are more important than others, and why.  The major takeaway from this 
analysis is the resulting combined ranking of all three areas.  In descending order the list 
of most influential factors are: smaller parties and coalition structure, the prime minister, 
the defense establishment, and right of center interest groups.  It should be noted this 
ranking is artificial.  It is based solely on the author’s interpretation of the research and 
analysis in this thesis.  
Small parties and in a related manner coalition structure rank highest in level of 
input to foreign policymaking.  Smaller parties are more coherent and unified in their 
foreign policy focus than the traditional larger ones.  It is these small parties, in the 
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dynamics of a parliamentary system, that are able to make bold moves in coalition 
politics.  The structure of coalitions allows these smaller parties to hold the vitality of the 
government in the balance and therefore pressure for their foreign policy stances to be 
followed.  Therefore, small extreme parties control what the prime minister is able to do 
in the Palestinian peace process.  
The prime minister is supreme in certain circumstances and therefore ranks as the 
second most influential domestic player in Israel’s foreign policymaking.  In issues not 
requiring a Knesset vote or treaties, the premier has the final word in matters of foreign 
policy.  There are additional circumstances where the prime minister is supreme. For 
instance, when the budget vote is far off he has more room to maneuver without threat of 
the Knesset stalling to approve it.  When a budget vote is near, the prime minister has to 
focus energy on getting it passed which takes energy away from foreign policy measures.  
Another circumstance where the prime minister is in a strong position is when he has the 
backing of the cabinet.  The cabinet is made up of his own party, other coalition party 
leaders, and senior military officers.  If the executive has the support of policy stances in 
the cabinet—and in turn the constituencies they lead—he is in a strong enough position to 
push forward with foreign policy initiatives.  Outside these parameters the prime minister 
is limited by other domestic players in shaping which policy approaches Israel pursues.  
The prime minister has commanding, yet not ultimate authority.   
The military has the most impact on foreign policy as an opinion constituency.  
Even though the IDF obeys orders from civilian origins, it can still articulate views 
different from the government.  For instance, the Chief of Staff can make public 
commentary on policy that opens up an avenue for influence though effecting public 
opinion, though this is extremely hard to quantify.  Also, dissention in civil-military 
relations over foreign policy positions can be problematic when the military always 
serves as a contributor in foreign policy formation.  Imagine a scenario where the IDF, 
who heavily participates in Israel’s decisionmaking apparatus, were to advocate a certain 
position based upon their best judgment that was in direct contrast to that of the civilian 
leadership.  The government depends on the military for input on national security 
concerns when charting the coarse for foreign policy.  If the two are in disagreement over 
the optimal policy approach the waters can become quite murky. 
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For all the publicity they get, one might think interest groups get top billing in the 
policymaking process. Yet, only right of center interest groups tend to have an impact on 
foreign policy, albeit indirectly.  Labor need not heed the demands of left of center 
interest groups—they are a captive audience.  On the other hand, Likud must be very 
responsive to interest groups on the right because it does not have a monopoly on this 
segment of society.  If Likud chooses to ignore the policy preferences of say Women in 
Green or the Yesha Council, these groups can take their support to United Torah Judaism 
or the National Religious Party. Another point to take into account however is that 
mobilization does not equal direct input into foreign policy.  Interest groups may rally 
Israeli public opinion, but because of Israel’s system of government, the influence of the 
population on foreign policy stops after casting the ballot.  
These findings hold wider relevance.  For one, the same theory that domestic 
factors influence Israel’s Palestinian policy can also be applied to broader Israeli foreign 
policy contexts. For example, domestic influence clearly played a huge role in Israel’s 
pullout from Lebanon. Other possibilities are the Syrian peace track, which has been an 
area of contention for decades, as well as relations with other Arab neighbors.     
The findings of this thesis can be further used in studying foreign policy in a 
number of other scenarios. For states that are small, yet highly populated, going through 
democratic consolidation with parliamentary systems in an environment infused with 
foreigners and entrenched in conflict – domestic components significantly impact foreign 
policy behavior.  In cases like these, international frameworks are not the best means to 
understand such states because they may not act as national actors, but as a result of 
domestic pressures.  To summarize, for Israel and other similar states, foreign policy 
measures are victims of domestic political structures. 
 The United States has a close relationship with Israel, and with this support comes 
the potential to impact our ally.  Therefore a thorough understanding of Israel by U.S. 
policymakers is of the utmost importance. This thesis meets the vital need to gain an 
internal perspective as to what makes Israel tick.  By understanding Israel’s domestic 
drivers in foreign policy, U.S. policymakers can better understand how to shape the U.S.-
Israel relationship to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  This will in turn 
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compliment U.S objectives throughout the Middle East and improve American sentiment 
in the region.   
 Although the purpose of this chapter was to delineate the most significant 
domestic access points to Israeli foreign policy, it will go one step further.  With the 
above ranking some recommendations can be made for U.S. policy regarding Israel.  
First, U.S. policy in reference to Israeli-Palestinian relations must be coherent and of 
common vision among the President, legislature, and cabinet: to promote the peace 
process. Only then will any of the following suggestions have the possibility of success. 
Also, it must be understood that even when the goal of the U.S. policymaking elite is to 
get countries to do what they want them to, it is extremely difficult to influence countries 
from the outside. Therefore, all of these recommendations will have limited influence. 
These recommendations will aim—depending on the appropriate situation—to convince, 
constrain, or influence elements within Israel to do what is most productive in moving 
forward in the peace process with the Palestinians, which simultaneously serves U.S. 
objectives in the Middle East.   
 There are a few ideas pertaining to smaller parties in Israel.  As shown previously, 
smaller parties in the ruling coalition are the real ones pulling the strings in Israel’s 
behavior.  American embassies or envoys need to up the ante on their engagement of the 
parliamentary and cabinet representation of small parties, as opposed to the majority 
party (which is more instinctual).  Inviting small party leaders to the United States in 
order to have an effect on their operations can do this.  The U.S. should also be smarter 
about deciding which small party initiatives to support and give money to. Perhaps the 
biggest lesson derived from the understanding of coalition politics is for the U.S. to time 
diplomatic initiatives in congruence with the cycle of coalition formation.  Since small 
parties have so much sway in the coalition and therein policy, better to connect with them 
before the coalition is put together.  
 The initial recommendation for U.S. policymakers in regards to the Israeli prime 
minister is to determine if he is the right man to serve American interests.  If so, they 
need to strengthen him.  This can be accomplished through supporting the cabinet and 
Knesset members from his party.  Frequent and high level visits with these players will 
promote appearances and garner support within the premier’s party and the electorate.  
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The U.S. embassy in Tel-Aviv should praise the prime minister and guarantee the success 
of his initiatives.  By making such gestures, the U.S. can help show the Israeli people that 
it is worthwhile to support the prime minister and his Palestinian policy initiatives.  
However, if the U.S. finds the prime minister is not the best person for their goals, the 
same mechanisms (cabinet, Knesset, electorate) can be employed to weaken him and at 
the same time strengthen his opponent.  For example, the U.S. should hold meetings to 
pursue other parties and potential leaders. 
 Recommendations for the military involve reaching out to the IDF.  The military 
is an advocacy group with the civilian electorate and politicians. The U.S. should invite 
young officers to America for education, for instance to the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Experiences in the U.S. and relationships built will shape their views down the line when 
they hold the elite positions of power.  Similarly, the U.S. should invite more senior IDF 
officers to the National Defense University.  The association of current and future Israeli 
military leaders with America will open access points for U.S. influence. Additionally, 
the U.S. should coordinate our policies with military aid offered to Israel. While doing so, 
the U.S. must show the IDF we understand Israel’s strategic predicament and then work 
to couple it with our own desires.  These efforts will nudge the IDF as a corporate force 
in America’s direction.  
 Foreign interest groups are hard to control, but there are some recommendations 
for U.S. policymakers. The U.S. should not have their representatives in Israel meet with 
the far right interest groups or lend them legitimacy.  On the same note, aid should not be 
provided to these groups to support their operations, which are counterproductive in the 
Palestinian peace process. Also, the same groups or movements should be shut out here.  
U.S. policymakers should not speak out in favor of far right interest groups.  
Furthermore, propaganda campaigns in the U.S. should be closely followed, as Israeli 
interest groups preventing wider Israeli desires should not even be given a podium in 
America.  
 All the aforementioned recommendations are a group of tools at the United 
State’s disposal.  Like all building projects, multiple tools must be utilized to make 
progress.  These recommendations cannot be implemented in isolation, but must be 
applied in combination with each other.  Even with the policy suggestions made above, 
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ultimately U.S. influence will always be limited, because as this thesis proves—domestic 
drivers in Israel are vitally fundamental to foreign policy. 
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